Peer-reviewed journal articles
2019. Measuring Knowledge of Parties’ Legislative Seat Shares. Political Science Research and Methods, 7 (1) (with Seonghui Lee and Randy Stevenson). Replication materials
2017. What explains voter turnout in Latin America? A test of the effect of citizens’ attitudes towards the electoral process. Revista de Ciencia Politica, Universidad Catolica de Chile 37(1):69-93.
2012. Patterns of interaction between the Executive and Legislative powers in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (1997-2009). A study about the impact of legislative fragmentation on the agenda power of the Head of Government, POSTData, 17 (2). [In Spanish]
“Negative partisanship in Latin America” (with Francisco Cantu) [In Spanish]. Primer Saque, May 2019.
“Why do electoral polls get it wrong?” (with Agustin Vallejo) [In Spanish]. El Estadista, August 2017.
Manuscripts under review
“Candidate experience and electoral success” (with Agustín Vallejo and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer)
Abstract: Studies in the American and comparative context that examine the individual-level determinants of a candidate’s electoral success have generally focused on a few variables, such as previous experience in elective and non-elective office. As a result, studies have overlooked the experience that candidates get from running campaigns even if they lose. In this paper, we argue that experience running for office, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, gives candidates three types of benefits: knowledge and expertise in running strong campaigns, a network of connections that is helpful in funding campaigns, and visibility among the electorate. As a result, candidate experience should have a positive impact on electoral success. We test our main expectation in Brazil using a database of candidates for seven different types of elected offices from 1998 to 2018 We show that candidates who ran for elected offices where they receive high visibility, can develop strong networks, and gain campaign experience are more likely to win when they run for election. Our results support our three main expectations and suggest the importance of not just officeholding experience but candidate experience for electoral success.
Abstract: The literature on comparative partisanship has demonstrated the low rates of party identification in many developing democracies. This literature, however, has mostly ignored the way in which citizens negatively relate to the parties in the system. This paper argues that voters use this adverse affection towards a party, or negative partisanship, as a reference point for what they do not want to be identified with. To support this claim, we analyze an original conjoint experiment in Argentina and Mexico, as well as two other public opinion surveys fielded in Latin America. The study presents empirical evidence indicating that negative partisanship works as a political identity and is based on voters’ political orientations and values. Further analyses verify the independence of negative partisanship from its positive counterpart and from a general distrust of the entire party system.
“Cabinet composition and electoral accountability in presidential coalition democracies” (with Thiago Silva and Thiago Moreira)
Abstract: An extensive literature on accountability in parliamentary systems has focused on the effect that cabinet type (i.e., single-party vs coalition) has on the electoral fate of governments for their economic performance. In presidential systems, studies on government accountability have focused on the impact of having unified or divided government on the electoral success of the president’s party. Neither of these literatures has examined how variations in cabinet composition can affect governments’ accountability. In this paper, we seek to fill this important gap in the literature by examining how cabinet composition can affect accountability for economic outcomes, focusing our analysis on Latin American democracies. Building on the theory of clarity of responsibility, we argue that when presidents appoint ministers who are aligned with their preferences, the ideological dispersion of the government cabinet will be minimal, and voters will be more likely to punish the president for bad economic outcomes, as this corresponds to a high clarity of responsibility situation. In turn, when the president is unable to appoint ministers completely aligned with her preferences, the ideological dispersion of the coalition will be larger and voters will be less likely to punish the president’s party for bad economic outcomes. To test these hypotheses, we combine aggregate-level data on cabinet composition and on the level of discretion that the president has to form her preferred cabinet, and survey data from 12 Latin American countries. Our preliminary results provide evidence in favor of our main argument.